in 1975 alone

1. (в отличие от нескольких, многих, других и т. п.) one тк. sg.; one pair (of) (при сущ. во мн. ч.); мн. ( при противопоставлении одной группы другой) some

2. (тот же, одинаковый) the same

3. ( без других) alone; by oneself indef. (1. pers. sg. by myself, 3. pers. sg. by himself и т. д.) (ср. сам; об. с оттенком самостоятельности); (без помощи тж.) all by oneself indef. и т. д.; single-handed

4. ( только) only adv.; (никто другой тж.) alone; (ничего кроме тж.) nothing but

5. ( некоторый) об. передаётся через неопред. артикль: a, an; тж. a certain ( более подчёркнуто)

   1) The Book of Nature Is Written in the Language of Mathematics

   Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)

   2) Arranging Speech so as to Reply Appropriately

   It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)

   3) No Other Animal Has the Language Capacity of the Human

   It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)

   4) Human Beings Do Not Live Only in the World of Objects

   Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)

   5) Language Powerfully Conditions All Our Thinking

   It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)

   6) A List of Language Games

   [A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]

   Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling it

   Solving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into another

   LANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)

   7) Language Constrains Certain Modes of Interpretation

   We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)

   8) We Dissect Nature in Accordance with Our Native Languages

   We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.

   The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)

   9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own Language

   The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)

    10) The Analysis of Certain Types of Utterances

   It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)

    11) The Dictionary of a Language Is a System of Concepts

   In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)

    12) Talk about the Evolution of the Language Capacity is Beside the Point

   In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)

    13) The Development of Language

   [It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chiefly governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)

    14) Sentential and Conceptual Levels in Language

   he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.

   The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)

    15) Linguistic Realities Have Not Yet Been Captured by Theoretical Models

   The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.

   But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)

    16) The Final Steps to Human Language

   The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)

    17) The Inadequacy of Formal Linguistic Models for Ordinary Language Usage

    t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)

    18) When a Language Is an Abstract Machine

   A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)

    19) Metaphor and Metonymy Underpin the Formation of Linguistic Signs

   Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)

    20) Language and the Analysis of Nature

   It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)

    21) Correspondence Rules for Mapping Old Theory into Subsets of New Theory

   First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....

   Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)

    22) The Inclusion of Non- linguistic Factors in a Theory of Grammar

   If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)

    23) Language Is Inevitably Influenced by Specific Contexts of Human Interaction

   Language cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)

    24) The Genetic Blueprints of Language

   By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)

    25) Languages Are Machines

   Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)

(1415-1975)

   Portugal was the first Western European state to establish an early modern overseas empire beyond the Mediterranean and perhaps the last colonial power to decolonize. A vast subject of complexity that is full of myth as well as debatable theories, the history of the Portuguese overseas empire involves the story of more than one empire, the question of imperial motives, the nature of Portuguese rule, and the results and consequences of empire, including the impact on subject peoples as well as on the mother country and its society, Here, only the briefest account of a few such issues can be attempted.

   There were various empires or phases of empire after the capture of the Moroccan city of Ceuta in 1415. There were at least three Portuguese empires in history: the First empire (1415-1580), the Second empire (1580-1640 and 1640-1822), and the Third empire (1822-1975).

   With regard to the second empire, the so-called Phillipine period (1580-1640), when Portugal's empire was under Spanish domination, could almost be counted as a separate era. During that period, Portugal lost important parts of its Asian holdings to England and also sections of its colonies of Brazil, Angola, and West Africa to Holland's conquests. These various empires could be characterized by the geography of where Lisbon invested its greatest efforts and resources to develop territories and ward off enemies.

   The first empire (1415-1580) had two phases. First came the African coastal phase (1415-97), when the Portuguese sought a foothold in various Moroccan cities but then explored the African coast from Morocco to past the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. While colonization and sugar farming were pursued in the Atlantic islands, as well as in the islands in the Gulf of Guinea like São Tomé and Príncipe, for the most part the Portuguese strategy was to avoid commitments to defending or peopling lands on the African continent. Rather, Lisbon sought a seaborne trade empire, in which the Portuguese could profit from exploiting trade and resources (such as gold) along the coasts and continue exploring southward to seek a sea route to Portuguese India. The second phase of the first empire (1498-1580) began with the discovery of the sea route to Asia, thanks to Vasco da Gama's first voyage in 1497-99, and the capture of strong points, ports, and trading posts in order to enforce a trade monopoly between Asia and Europe. This Asian phase produced the greatest revenues of empire Portugal had garnered, yet ended when Spain conquered Portugal and commanded her empire as of 1580.

   Portugal's second overseas empire began with Spanish domination and ran to 1822, when Brazil won her independence from Portugal. This phase was characterized largely by Brazilian dominance of imperial commitment, wealth in minerals and other raw materials from Brazil, and the loss of a significant portion of her African and Asian coastal empire to Holland and Great Britain. A sketch of Portugal's imperial losses either to native rebellions or to imperial rivals like Britain and Holland follows:

   • Morocco (North Africa) (sample only)

   Arzila—Taken in 1471; evacuated in 1550s; lost to Spain in 1580, which returned city to a sultan.

   Ceuta—Taken in 1415; lost to Spain in 1640 (loss confirmed in 1668 treaty with Spain).

   • Tangiers—Taken in 15th century; handed over to England in 1661 as part of Catherine of Braganza's dowry to King Charles II.

   • West Africa

   • Fort/Castle of São Jorge da Mina, Gold Coast (in what is now Ghana)—Taken in 1480s; lost to Holland in 1630s.

   • Middle East

   Socotra-isle—Conquered in 1507; fort abandoned in 1511; used as water resupply stop for India fleet.

   Muscat—Conquered in 1501; lost to Persians in 1650.

   Ormuz—Taken, 1505-15 under Albuquerque; lost to England, which gave it to Persia in the 17th century.

   Aden (entry to Red Sea) — Unsuccessfully attacked by Portugal (1513-30); taken by Turks in 1538.

   • India

   • Ceylon (Sri Lanka)—Taken by 1516; lost to Dutch after 1600.

   • Bombay—Taken in 16th century; given to England in 1661 treaty as part of Catherine of Braganza's dowry for Charles II.

   • East Indies

   • Moluccas—Taken by 1520; possession confirmed in 1529 Saragossa treaty with Spain; lost to Dutch after 1600; only East Timor remaining.

   After the restoration of Portuguese independence from Spain in 1640, Portugal proceeded to revive and strengthen the Anglo- Portuguese Alliance, with international aid to fight off further Spanish threats to Portugal and drive the Dutch invaders out of Brazil and Angola. While Portugal lost its foothold in West Africa at Mina to the Dutch, dominion in Angola was consolidated. The most vital part of the imperial economy was a triangular trade: slaves from West Africa and from the coasts of Congo and Angola were shipped to plantations in Brazil; raw materials (sugar, tobacco, gold, diamonds, dyes) were sent to Lisbon; Lisbon shipped Brazil colonists and hardware. Part of Portugal's War of Restoration against Spain (1640-68) and its reclaiming of Brazil and Angola from Dutch intrusions was financed by the New Christians (Jews converted to Christianity after the 1496 Manueline order of expulsion of Jews) who lived in Portugal, Holland and other low countries, France, and Brazil. If the first empire was mainly an African coastal and Asian empire, the second empire was primarily a Brazilian empire.

   Portugal's third overseas empire began upon the traumatic independence of Brazil, the keystone of the Lusitanian enterprise, in 1822. The loss of Brazil greatly weakened Portugal both as a European power and as an imperial state, for the scattered remainder of largely coastal, poor, and uncolonized territories that stretched from the bulge of West Africa to East Timor in the East Indies and Macau in south China were more of a financial liability than an asset. Only two small territories balanced their budgets occasionally or made profits: the cocoa islands of São Tomé and Príncipe in the Gulf of Guinea and tiny Macau, which lost much of its advantage as an entrepot between the West and the East when the British annexed neighboring Hong Kong in 1842. The others were largely burdens on the treasury. The African colonies were strapped by a chronic economic problem: at a time when the slave trade and then slavery were being abolished under pressures from Britain and other Western powers, the economies of Guinea- Bissau, São Tomé/Príncipe, Angola, and Mozambique were totally dependent on revenues from the slave trade and slavery. During the course of the 19th century, Lisbon began a program to reform colonial administration in a newly rejuvenated African empire, where most of the imperial efforts were expended, by means of replacing the slave trade and slavery, with legitimate economic activities.

   Portugal participated in its own early version of the "Scramble" for Africa's interior during 1850-69, but discovered that the costs of imperial expansion were too high to allow effective occupation of the hinterlands. After 1875, Portugal participated in the international "Scramble for Africa" and consolidated its holdings in west and southern Africa, despite the failure of the contra-costa (to the opposite coast) plan, which sought to link up the interiors of Angola and Mozambique with a corridor in central Africa. Portugal's expansion into what is now Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (eastern section) in 1885-90 was thwarted by its oldest ally, Britain, under pressure from interest groups in South Africa, Scotland, and England. All things considered, Portugal's colonizing resources and energies were overwhelmed by the African empire it possessed after the frontier-marking treaties of 1891-1906. Lisbon could barely administer the massive area of five African colonies, whose total area comprised about 8 percent of the area of the colossal continent. The African territories alone were many times the size of tiny Portugal and, as of 1914, Portugal was the third colonial power in terms of size of area possessed in the world.

   The politics of Portugal's empire were deceptive. Lisbon remained obsessed with the fear that rival colonial powers, especially Germany and Britain, would undermine and then dismantle her African empire. This fear endured well into World War II. In developing and keeping her potentially rich African territories (especially mineral-rich Angola and strategically located Mozambique), however, the race against time was with herself and her subject peoples. Two major problems, both chronic, prevented Portugal from effective colonization (i.e., settling) and development of her African empire: the economic weakness and underdevelopment of the mother country and the fact that the bulk of Portuguese emigration after 1822 went to Brazil, Venezuela, the United States, and France, not to the colonies. These factors made it difficult to consolidate imperial control until it was too late; that is, until local African nationalist movements had organized and taken the field in insurgency wars that began in three of the colonies during the years 1961-64.

   Portugal's belated effort to revitalize control and to develop, in the truest sense of the word, Angola and Mozambique after 1961 had to be set against contemporary events in Europe, Africa, and Asia. While Portugal held on to a backward empire, other European countries like Britain, France, and Belgium were rapidly decolonizing their empires. Portugal's failure or unwillingness to divert the large streams of emigrants to her empire after 1850 remained a constant factor in this question. Prophetic were the words of the 19th-century economist Joaquim Oliveira Martins, who wrote in 1880 that Brazil was a better colony for Portugal than Africa and that the best colony of all would have been Portugal itself. As of the day of the Revolution of 25 April 1974, which sparked the final process of decolonization of the remainder of Portugal's third overseas empire, the results of the colonization program could be seen to be modest compared to the numbers of Portuguese emigrants outside the empire. Moreover, within a year, of some 600,000 Portuguese residing permanently in Angola and Mozambique, all but a few thousand had fled to South Africa or returned to Portugal.

   In 1974 and 1975, most of the Portuguese empire was decolonized or, in the case of East Timor, invaded and annexed by a foreign power before it could consolidate its independence. Only historic Macau, scheduled for transfer to the People's Republic of China in 1999, remained nominally under Portuguese control as a kind of footnote to imperial history. If Portugal now lacked a conventional overseas empire and was occupied with the challenges of integration in the European Union (EU), Lisbon retained another sort of informal dependency that was a new kind of empire: the empire of her scattered overseas Portuguese communities from North America to South America. Their numbers were at least six times greater than that of the last settlers of the third empire.

    See also Luso-Tropicalism; Rose-colored map; Ultimatum, English.

the.

them.

* * *

► artículo def

1 the

■ los niños the boys

► pronombre

1 (objeto directo) them; (ustedes) you

■ los vi I saw them

■ a ustedes dos no los quiero volver a ver I don't want to see you two again Table 1 NOTA See also lo, el/Table 1

* * *

1) them

2) you

•

- los que

* * *

PRON PERS [refiriéndose a ellos, ellas] them; [refiriéndose a ustedes] you

* * *

las articulo: ver el

las pronombre personal

1) (referido - a ellos, ellas, cosas, etc) them; (- a ustedes) you

2) (con el verbo

* * *

= the, ye

Ex. The first institute, 'The Catalog: Its Nature and Prospects,' was held in New York City on October 9 and 10, 1975.

Ex. The article 'Ye olde smart card' presents an annotated list of information sources on the credit card industry.

* * *

las articulo: ver el

las pronombre personal

1) (referido - a ellos, ellas, cosas, etc) them; (- a ustedes) you

2) (con el verbo

* * *

* * *

ver el

A (referido — a ellos, ellas, cosas, etc) them; (— a ustedes) you

les prometí que los llevaría al circo I promised (them) I'd take them to the circus

no te lleves esos discos, todavía no los he escuchado don't take those records away, I haven't listened to them yet

a mis primas hace años que no las veo I haven't seen my cousins in years, it's been years since I saw my cousins

estos cachivaches los voy a tirar a la basura I'm going to throw this junk in the dustbin

¿las atienden, señoras? are you being served, ladies?

B (con el verbo:

haber): las hay de muchos tamaños they come in many different sizes

también los hay de chocolate we have chocolate ones too

los hay en todas las ciudades del mundo you find them in every city in the world

* * *

◊ las art;

◊ ¿las atienden? can I help you?

◊ haber): las hay de muchos tamaños they come in many different sizes;

* * *

♦ art

♦ pron

* * *

I art the

II pron complemento directo pl them; a ustedes you;

llévate los que quieras take whichever ones you want;

los de … those of …;

los de Juan Juan’s;

los que juegan the ones o those that are playing

* * *

los, las pron

1) : them

hice galletas y se las di a los nuevos vecinos: I made cookies and gave them to the new neighbors

2) : you

voy a llevarlos a los dos: I am going to take both of you

los que, las que : those, who, the ones

los que van a cantar deben venir temprano: those who are singing must come early

4) (used with haber)

los hay en varios colores: they come in various colors

los el

* * *

los¹ det

1. (en general) the

2. (cuando sustituye un nombre) one

A veces, donde el español usa los, el inglés prefiere un adjetivo posesivo

los² pron

1. (ellos) them

2. (ustedes) you

   Portugal's independence and sovereignty as a nation-state are based on being separate from Spain. Achieving this on a peninsula where its only landward neighbor, Spain, is stronger, richer, larger, and more populous, raises interesting historical questions. Considering the disparity in size of population alone — Spain (as of 2000) had a population of 40 million, whereas Portugal's population numbered little over 10 million—how did Portugal maintain its sometimes precarious independence? If the Basques, Catalans, and Galicians succumbed to Castilian military and political dominance and were incorporated into greater Spain, how did little Portugal manage to survive the "Spanish menace?" A combination of factors enabled Portugal to keep free of Spain, despite the era of "Babylonian Captivity" (1580-1640). These include an intense Portuguese national spirit; foreign assistance in staving off Spanish invasions and attacks between the late 14th century and the mid l9th century, principally through the Anglo- Portuguese Alliance and some assistance from France; historical circumstances regarding Spain's own trials and tribulations and decline in power after 1600.

   In Portugal's long history, Castile and Leon (later "Spain," as unified in the 16th century) acted as a kind of Iberian mother and stepmother, present at Portugal's birth as well as at times when Portuguese independence was either in danger or lost. Portugal's birth as a separate state in the 12th century was in part a consequence of the king of Castile's granting the "County of Portucale" to a transplanted Burgundian count in the late 11th century. For centuries Castile, Leon, Aragon, and Portugal struggled for supremacy on the peninsula, until the Castilian army met defeat in 1385 at the battle of Aljubarrota, thus assuring Portugal's independence for nearly two centuries. Portugal and its overseas empire suffered considerably under rule by Phillipine Spain (1580-1640). Triumphant in the War of Restoration against Spain (1640-68), Portugal came to depend on its foreign alliances to provide a counterweight to a still menacing kindred neighbor. Under the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, England (later Great Britain) managed to help Portugal thwart more than a few Spanish invasion threats in the next centuries. Rumors and plots of Spain consuming Portugal continued during the 19th century and even during the first Portuguese republic's early years to 1914.

   Following difficult diplomatic relations during Spain's subsequent Second Republic (1931-36) and civil war (1936-39), Luso-Span-ish relations improved significantly under the authoritarian regimes that ruled both states until the mid-1970s. Portugal's prime minister Antônio de Oliveira Salazar and Spain's generalissimo Francisco Franco signed nonaggression and other treaties, lent each other mutual support, and periodically consulted one another on vital questions. During this era (1939-74), there were relatively little trade, business, and cultural relations between the two neighbors, who mainly tended to ignore one another. Spain's economy developed more rapidly than Portugal's after 1950, and General Franco was quick to support the Estado Novo across the frontier if he perceived a threat to his fellow dictator's regime. In January 1962, for instance, Spanish army units approached the Portuguese frontier in case the abortive military coup at Beja (where a Portuguese oppositionist plot failed) threatened the Portuguese dictatorship.

   Since Portugal's Revolution of 25 April 1974, and the death of General Franco and the establishment of democracy in Spain (1975-78), Luso-Spanish relations have improved significantly. Portugal has experienced a great deal of Spanish investment, tourism, and other economic activities, since both Spain and Portugal became members of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986.

   Yet, Portugal's relations with Spain have become closer still, with increased integration in the European Union. Portugal remains determined not to be confused with Spain, and whatever threat from across the frontier exists comes more from Spanish investment than from Spanish winds, marriages, and armies. The fact remains that Luso-Spanish relations are more open and mutually beneficial than perhaps at any other time in history.

Grammatical information: v.

Meaning: `want, wish' (Il.).

Dialectal forms: Arc.-Cypr. Eretr. (also Hom., s. Chantr. Gramm. hom. 1, 311) βόλομαι, Lesb. βόλλομαι, Dor. (Cret.) βώλομαι; Thess. βέλλομαι, Boeot. βείλομη, Dor. (Heracl. etc.) δήλομαι, Locr. Delph. δείλομαι. - Other tempora are based on the present: βουλήσομαι, ἐβουλήθην, βεβούλημαι; to βέβουλα (Α 113) below.

Derivatives: βουλή `will, decision, council' (Il.); Dor. Arc. βωλά, Lesb. βόλλα. Denomin. βουλεύω ( βωλ-, βολλ-εύω), - ομαι `deliberate' (Il.), with many deriv.: βούλευμα, βουλεία, βουλευτής, βουλευτήριον `council-chamber'.

Origin: IE [Indo-European] [472?] * gʷel- (* gʷelh₃-?) `want, wish'

Etymology: The verb is much discussed and there is no agreement on its history. The root must have been *gʷel-\/gʷol-. - There may have been a perfect with present meaning *βέβολα, a trace of which could be προ-βέβουλα (Α 113) with newly introduced ου from βούλομαι. The o-vocalism and the β- may have been spread from the perfect. (There may also have been influence of βουλή, but this may itself have been derived from the present.) But it seems doubtful that the perfect alone is the source of all the o-vowels. - The central problem is the origin of the present. One has assumed an n- or an s-suffix; Ruijgh, Lingua 25 (1970) 315f. thinks only - λν- can explain the compensatory lengthening. S. Slings, Mnemosyne 28 (1975) 1-16. - Recently Peters, FS Risch 1986, 311, suggests a root in -h₃. This may help explain the o-vocalism. A nasal present * gʷl-n-h₃- would have given *βαλνο- [or βλανο-?] which was replaced by *βολν-. Pamphylian βΟλΕμενος would have βολε- \< *βελο- \< * gʷelh₃-. Many problems of detail remain. E.g. there is no evidence for βλω- and no basis for the introduction of the o-vocalism; in this view the e-vocalism is also problematic. - On the relation between βούλομαι, ἐθέλω and λῆν s. Braun Atti R. Ist. Veneto 98, 337ff.; Rödiger Glotta 8, 1ff.; Wifstrand Eranos 40, 16ff.

Page in Frisk: 1,258-259

SUBJECT AREA: Land transport, Mining and extraction technology, Railways and locomotives

[br]

[br]

[br]

The Wylam wagonway passed Newburn, and Hedley, who went to school at Wylam, must have been familiar with this wagonway from childhood. It had been built c.1748 to carry coal from Wylam Colliery to the navigable limit of the Tyne at Lemington. In 1805 Hedley was appointed viewer, or manager, of Wylam Colliery by Christopher Blackett, who had inherited the colliery and wagonway in 1800. Unlike most Tyneside wagonways, the gradient of the Wylam line was insufficient for loaded wagons to run down by gravity and they had to be hauled by horses. Blackett had a locomotive, of the type designed by Richard Trevithick, built at Gateshead as early as 1804 but did not take delivery, probably because his wooden track was not strong enough. In 1808 Blackett and Hedley relaid the wagonway with plate rails of the type promoted by Benjamin Outram, and in 1812, following successful introduction of locomotives at Middleton by John Blenkinsop, Blackett asked Hedley to investigate the feasibility of locomotives at Wylam. The expense of re-laying with rack rails was unwelcome, and Hedley experimented to find out the relationship between the weight of a locomotive and the load it could move relying on its adhesion weight alone. He used first a model test carriage, which survives at the Science Museum, London, and then used a full-sized test carriage laden with weights in varying quantities and propelled by men turning handles. Having apparently satisfied himself on this point, he had a locomotive incorporating the frames and wheels of the test carriage built. The work was done at Wylam by Thomas Waters, who was familiar with the 1804 locomotive, Timothy Hackworth, foreman smith, and Jonathan Forster, enginewright. This locomotive, with cast-iron boiler and single cylinder, was unsatisfactory: Hackworth and Forster then built another locomotive to Hedley's design, with a wrought-iron return-tube boiler, two vertical external cylinders and drive via overhead beams through pinions to the two axles. This locomotive probably came into use in the spring of 1814: it performed well and further examples of the type were built. Their axle loading, however, was too great for the track and from about 1815 each locomotive was mounted on two four-wheeled bogies, the bogie having recently been invented by William Chapman. Hedley eventually left Wylam in 1827 to devote himself to other colliery interests. He supported the construction of the Clarence Railway, opened in 1833, and sent his coal over it in trains hauled by his own locomotives. Two of his Wylam locomotives survive— Puffing Billy at the Science Museum, London, and Wylam Dilly at the Royal Museum of Scotland, Edinburgh—though how much of these is original and how much dates from the period 1827–32, when the Wylam line was re-laid with edge rails and the locomotives reverted to four wheels (with flanges), is a matter of mild controversy.

[br]

See also: Stephenson, George

   1) To Exist Is to Be Perceived

   It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)

   2) Abstract Science or Demonstration Is a More Perfect Species of Knowledge

   It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.

   But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)

   3) Knowledge Derives from Two Fundamental Sources of the Mind

   Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).

   Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])

   4) The Means by Which Metaphysics Can Be Perfected as a Science

   Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....

   This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)

   5) Knowledge Is Only Real in the Form of System

   Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)

   6) Knowledge, Action, and Evaluation Are Interconnected

   Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)

   7) The Evolution of Knowledge

   "Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.

   Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)

   1) The Self ( Personal Identity) Is But a Bundle or Collection of Perceptions

   There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity....

   For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception....

   [S]etting aside some metaphysicians... I may venture to affirm, of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at any one time, nor identity in different, whatever natural propensity we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. [It is merely] the successive perceptions... that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where the scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed. (Hume, 1978, pp. 251-256)

   2) To Find Wherein Personal Identity Consists

   To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and, as it seems to me, essential for it-it being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.

   When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions; and by this everyone is to himself that which he calls self, not being considered in this case whether the same self be continued in the same or different substances. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e., the sameness of a rational being. And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person. It is the same self now it was then, and it is by the same self as this present one that now reflects on it, that action was done. (Locke, 1975, Bk. II, Chap. 27, Sec. 9-10)